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I. INTRODUCTION
An ancient parable, perhaps aptly attributed to different lineages and
cultures, tells the story of several blind people attempting to figure out an
elephant by feeling its contours, although each person can touch only a
different part of the elephant.' Each feature of the elephant is accurately
described, but no account adequately captures "the whole of the beast."2 In
many ways, the WTO stands today like the elephant in the parable. Some
commentators extol the success of the WTO dispute system in securing an
"excellent compliance record" in adjudicated decisions, particularly when
compared to the prior GATT system.3 Others, however, believe the WTO
system is deeply flawed or ineffective for any number of reasons.4 But no
matter how many commentators attempt to analyze the WTO, none is able to
capture the whole of the beast. Although numerous scholars have attempted to
assess how successful the WTO has been so far, their answers have been
dependent on the particular feature analyzed and the perspective of each
analyzer, much like the accounts of the blind people in the parable.
This Article continues in the same vein. It assesses one aspect of the WTO:
a country's efforts to correct a violation of the TRIPS Agreement5 as found by
a WTO decision in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). As the tale above
cautions, this inquiry provides only a limited view of the functioning of the
WTO.
But this analysis is important for at least two reasons. First, at the WTO's
inception, the elaborate framework established by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the WTO was hailed as the "crown jewel" of the entire WTO
1 See, e.g., THE UDANA & THE ITIVUTTAKA 86-89 (trans. John D. Ireland) (1997) (Buddhist
version); JOHN G. SAXE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 111-12 (1892) (Hindu
version).
2 See A.J. ARBERRY, TALES FROM THE MASNAVI 208 (1961).
3 See William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
119, 119 (2009); see also Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
7-8 (2010); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303, 321
(2004).
4 See, e.g., Brian Manning & Srividhya Ragavan, The Dispute Settlement Process of the WTO: A
Normative Structure to Achieve Utilitarian Objectives, 79 UMKC L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2010); John Ragosta et
al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 INT'L LAw. 697, 698 (2003).
s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS].
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system.6 Thus, one cannot determine if the WTO is successful in its mission
without some analysis of its dispute settlement system. That is particularly true
for intellectual property laws, which, unlike trade laws subject to the prior
GATT regime, had no prior international enforcement mechanism to handle
disputes before the creation of the WTO. 7 Second, examining WTO decisions
involving TRIPS violations can provide a window on the WTO's effectiveness
in encouraging or inducing compliance in difficult or contentious controversies
between countries-or, in other words, the hard cases.8 A true test of any
institution is its ability to handle the controversies that are difficult to resolve.9
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II surveys TRIPS disputes brought
before the WTO since its inception (1995 to Jan. 2011), with particular focus on
disputes that culminated in a panel or Appellate Body (AB) decision. Part III
proposes that the WTO should adopt a TRIPS Compliance Scorecard that will
keep track of a country's responses to its violations. Two alternative methods
are offered-a simple and a complex score. The Scorecard can offer greater
transparency, enable greater cross-country comparisons, and perhaps serve to
induce countries to correct their violations in a reasonable time. Part IV
discusses other measures that the WTO can adopt alongside the TRIPS
Compliance Scorecard, including computing scorecards for countries'
compliance in all other WTO disputes and imposing procedural penalties on
countries with low compliance scores. Part V addresses objections.
II. STATISTICS ON THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF TRIPS
The fifteenth anniversary of the TRIPS Agreement's effective date marks a
good time for reflection. With the deadlock in the current Doha Round of
negotiations, the WTO, as an institution, seems at a crossroads.' 0 Yet, the
6 See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilatera&sm: Enforing International Trade Law at the TO, 30 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1134 (2009); Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship:
The Fund'sArticks ofAgreementandthe IPTO Agreements, 96 AM.J. INT'LL. 561, 583 (2002).
7 See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
8 One reason that TRIPS lends itself to hard cases is that many of its provisions or miumum
standards were left intentionally vague or open-ended, in order to bridge differences among
countries in the North v. South and North v. North (e.g., U.S. v. EU) divides. See CARLOS M.
CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 17 (2007).
9 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 274 (1993) [hereinafter EVOLUTION] ('The primary test of a
legal system is the extent to which the system can elicit compliance when a valid legal claim is
asserted.").
10 See Doha Stalemate Unlikely to Resolve This Year Khullar, FIN. EXPRESS (Sept. 14, 2010), http://
in.news.yahoo.com/doha-stalemate-unlikely-resolve-khullar.html.
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current stalemate cannot erase the accomplishments of the WTO over the past
fifteen years in handling trade-related disputes among countries. This Part
analyzes the number of IP disputes brought before the WTO since its inception
in 1995 to January 2011, and tracks how these IP disputes were disposed,
whether by settlement" or WTO decision. The survey shows the following: (i)
few IP challenges-29 of the 419 total WTO challenges (roughly 7%), or 22
disputes if related matters are paired-have been brought, the majority of which
(20 of 29 disputes, or 15 of 22 matters) were against developed countries; (ii)
only a few TRIPS challenges-8 matters or roughly 36% of the TRIPS
matters-were pursued to a WTO decision, with all but one finding a TRIPS
violation; (iii) only two TRIPS violations-both involving the U.S.-still have
not been corrected as of January 2011, although the EU, the complainant in
both cases, has not sought retaliation in either case; and (iv) the U.S. and EU
have.been the biggest participants in TRIPS disputes, both as complainant and
respondent, with every TRIPS dispute brought so far involving either the U.S.,
EU, or both.12
A. THE WTO'S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY AND UNDERSTANDING
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), created by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), 13 was touted to be a major development for
both international IP and trade. For the first time in history, countries
recognized an international institution that had enforcement power-putatively
with teeth-to help ensure countries complied with their international
obligations regarding the minimum standards of IP protection. All of the
prevailing international IP agreements prior to TRIPS-such as the Berne,
Paris, and Rome Conventions-lacked effective enforcement mechanisms to
11 For simplicity, in this Part, I include under "settlement" any dispute that was not pursued to
a formal WTO panel, even if no "mutually agreed settlement" was announced by the countries to
the WTO.
12 See infra Part II.B. Joost Pauwelyn conducted a similar study. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog
That Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Propertj Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT'L DIsp.
SETTLEMENT 389 (2010). Because his data set is smaller (up to DS402), and my groupings of
disputes may be different, my figures may be slightly different than his. For discussion of another
proposed index of TRIPS compliance that focuses on a country's IP statutes, see Intan M.
Hamdan-Livramento, How Complant Are Developing Countries with Their TRIPS Oblgations? (CEMI-
Working Paper, Jan. 16-23, 2009), available at http://cdm-it.epfl.ch/repec/cmi-wpaper/cerni-wor
kingpaper-2009-001.pdf.
13 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 16.4
& 17.14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter DSU].
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curb countries' violations of the treaties.14 In other words, before the WTO,
countries could violate their IP treaty obligations at will-and with impunity.
The DSB was designed to change that-not only for IP laws, but also for
international trade subject to the prior GATT system. The problem with the
dispute settlement system for obligations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) was that it was easy for countries to evade.
Both the establishment of and the ruling by a panel required a consensus
(sometimes called a "positive consensus") from member countries before the
GATT Council could adopt the ruling-which meant that a country found to
be in violation could "veto" or block a panel or ruling simply by voting against
it.15 On several occasions, countries "vetoed" adverse decisions, which may
have contributed to the overall lack of confidence in and infrequent use of the
GATT dispute system-only 100 panel reports were adopted between 1947 and
1994.16 By contrast, the WTO flips the approach, so that WTO panel decisions
are automatically approved unless a consensus (i.e., a "negative consensus") of
countries votes against adopting the decision.'7 Perhaps ironically, the change
in procedure occurred because the U.S. had been resorting to unilateral trade
sanctions against countries-under its trade law known as "Section 301" of the
14 Although the Berne and Paris Conventions authorize members to bring disputes before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), a member can opt out of the enforcement scheme and "not
consider itself bound" by the ICJ. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic
Works art. 33(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
221; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 28(2), Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; see also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits ofHarmoniZation, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 596,
597 (2006) (criticizing ICJ's apparatus as "toothless"); Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of
Intellectual Propertj Obhgations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliatng Against Technology-Exporting
Countries in the World Trade OrganiZadon, 97 GEo. L.J. 1365, 1377 & n.58 (2009). No country ever
brought a Berne Convention dispute before the ICJ. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the
Muldlateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 661, 664
n.13 (1997). The Rome Convention also authorizes disputes to be heard before the ICJ, but does
not allow countries to opt out. See Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations arts. 30-31, Oct. 26, 1961, 469
U.N.T.S. 43. However, the ICJ has been saddled with a slow process, and its decision ultimately
depends on either a country's acceptance or enforcement by the United Nation's Security
Council, which is unlikely for matters related to IP. See Monique L. Cordray, GATT P. WIPO, 76
J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 121, 131-32 (1994).
15 See Judith Hippler Bello, International Decisions, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 772, 773-74 (1995); Marian
Ladner & Ogbo Ossai, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade OraniZtadon, 20-SPG INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 15, 15 (2007) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement].
16 Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 895,
897 & nn.5-6 (2006).
17 Bello, supra note 15, at 773-74; DSU, supra note 13, arts. 16.4, 17.14.
6
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/4
2011] MEASURING TRIPS COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE
Trade Act of 197418-as a way to counteract the ability of offending countries
to veto GA'TT decisions.' 9 Other countries despised the U.S. Section 301
sanctions and made a deal with the U.S.: GATT decisions would be
automatically approved (unless a negative consensus voted against a decision),
and, in exchange, the U.S. would discontinue its unilateral Section 301 trade
sanctions.2 0
The DSU has a series of remedial steps for the DSB to take in response to a
violation, leading to the ultimate sanction of retaliation by a complainant
country against the offending country if it fails to comply. 21 First, the violating
country is afforded a "reasonable period of time" to implement the WTO
recommendations, which implementation typically consists of the country
bringing its laws into compliance. 22 As a suggested guideline, the time for
implementation is not to exceed fifteen months, although "the time may be
shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances." 23 If the
violating country does not fix the violation within the "reasonable period of
time," Article 22 of the DSU allows the complainant country to request (i)
mutually acceptable compensation from the violator, or, if no agreement is
reached between the countries, (ii) the complainant's suspension of concessions
or other obligations to the violator-what is commonly known as "retaliation"
or trade sanctions. 24 But these remedies are "temporary and shall only be
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered
agreement has been removed." 25 During this entire time, the DSB has a duty to
18 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006).
19 See Robert E. Hudec, The New WITO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three
Years, 8 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13 (1999) [hereinafter New WTOJ.
20 Id. For the most part, the U.S. has avoided using unilateral trade sanctions since the
formation of the WTO, but it still unilaterally monitors and issues warnings-in the so-called
Special 301 reports-against other countries for their lack of enforcement of IP law or blocking
of U.S. goods from their markets. See Sean Flynn & Joe Karaganis, From TRIPS to ACTA: The
Rise of the Enforcement Agenda (forthcoming 2011).
21 See DSU, supra note 13, arts. 21-22. As of January 2011, the WTO had authorized only 9
instances of retaliation, although the complainant may not have exercised that right in every
dispute-5 against the U.S., 2 against the EU, 1 against Brazil, 1 against Canada. See List of WTO
Disputes Authorizing Trade Sanctions 2011 (on file with author). The U.S. disputes were: DS108
(Foreign Sales Corporations); DS136 (Anti-Dumping Act of 1916); DS217/234 (Byrd
Amendment); DS267 (Upland Cotton); and DS285 (Gambling). The EU disputes were:
DS26/48 (Hormones); and DS27 (Bananas). The Brazil dispute was DS46 (Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft), while the related Canadian dispute was DS222 (Regional Aircraft).
22 See DSU, supra note 13, art. 21.2.
23 Id. art. 21.3(c).
24 Id. art. 22.3; see Davey, supra note 3, at 123 n.33.
25 DSU, supra note 13, art. 22.8.
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"keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or
rulings" and is supposed to monitor the situation "until the issue is resolved." 26
As should be evident, the DSU establishes an elaborate process whose main
goal is to secure either settlement or "[p]rompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB."27 One thing to note, however: the
remedial aspect of the DSU is forward-looking, seeking the removal or change
of the offending law by the violating country; it does not require the violating
country to pay compensation or a penalty for the past violation. In this regard,
the DSU is lenient on violations-and different from the approach in some
other areas of international law.28 Sanctions are to be imposed only after a
country refuses to comply with a WTO decision. As a general rule, the DSB
seeks prospective compliance by violating countries. 29 The next section examines
how well the DSB has achieved that end.
B. TRIPS DISPUTES: 1995-JANUARY 2011
From 1995 to January 2011, WTO countries brought 29 formal complaints
involving the TRIPS Agreement out of the 419 total challenges-or just
roughly 7% of all WTO disputes.30 Some of the complaints involved related
controversies, which, if paired together, would reduce the total number to 22
different TRIPS matters. 31 A recent set of challenges brought by India and
Brazil against the EU in 2010 for seizure of generic drugs in transit was still
pending in January 2011, although the dispute brought by India appears close to
a settlement.32
1. Settled Cases. Most of the TRIPS complaints were settled by the countries
or were not pursued to a WTO dispute panel. Excluding the pending EU
26 Id. art. 21.6.
27 Id. art. 21.1.
28 See David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute Settlement Understanding.- U.S.-Cotton's Relaxed
Interpretaton of Cross-Retaliation in the World Trade Organigation, 9 RIcH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 135,
145-46 (2010).
29 For an interesting proposal to use compensation as a remedy in the DSB, see Marco
Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Finandal Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of
ITTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 101 (2005).
30 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes 1995-2011 (Jan. 31, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Analysis of TRIPS Disputes].
31 See id.
32 See India-EU Generic Drug Ron 'Resolved" at Brussels Summit, BBC (Dec. 10, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-1 1971568; see also Dispute Settlement, European Union and a
Member State - Seizure of Genetic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 11, 2010) & WT/DS409/1
(May 12, 2010).
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generic drug dispute, 62% of TRIPS challenges (13 of 21 completed matters)
settled or were not pursued. 33
2. WITO Panel and AB Decisions. Out of the 21 resolved TRIPS matters, only
8 went to a WTO panel for decision.34 In all but one dispute (DS59 Indonesia
Auto) at least one violation of TRIPS was found.35 However, of the 7 matters
in which violations were found, it is worth pointing out that 5 of those
decisions also found some aspect of the respondent's challenged law was
consistent with TRIPS-perhaps rendering the appearance of a Solomonic
judgment. 36 Only 3 of the 7 (43/o) panel decisions in which a TRIPS violation
was found were appealed to the Appellate Body.37 That is lower than the
general rate for WTO panel decisions, for which approximately 70% of all panel
reports were appealed. 38
3. Disputes by Subject Matter. In terms of subject matter before the WTO
panels, 3 decisions involved patents; 2 involved copyrights; 3 involved
trademarks or geographical indications; and 1 also involved customs disposal of
counterfeit and pirated goods, as well as criminal law requirements under
TRIPS.39
33 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
34 See id.
3s See id.
36 See id.
37 See id
38 See Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2009 - A StatisticalAnaysis,
13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 205, 212 (2010).
39 See id. Some of the disputes also involve challenges brought under GATT or other trade
agreements, but they are included as long as one challenge in the disputes involves TRIPS. See,
e.g., Panel Decision, Indonesia-Certain MeasuresAfecting the Automobile Indust, WT/DS54/R (July 2,
1998) (DSB adopted July 23, 1998). Conversely, some non-TRIPS disputes involve IP-related
issues, but those were not included here. See infra note 123.
4092011]
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4. Complainants and Re.pondents. In the 22 TRIPS matters, the complainants
and respondents were as follows:
TRIPS DispurEs, 1995 To JAN. 2011
COMPLANANTS RESPONDENTS
(some matters have multiple complainants) (some matters have multiple respondents)
MEMBER DIsPuTEs MEMBER DisPuTEs
United States 17 EU 5
EU 7 United States 4
Brazil 2 Canada 2
Australia 1 China 2
Canada 1 Argentina 1
India 1 Brazil 1
Denmark 1
Greece 1
India 1
Indonesia I
Ireland 1
Japan 1
Pakistan 1
Portugal 1
Sweden 1
The breakdown of complainants and respondents is interesting on several
fronts. First, the U.S. is the biggest complainant, filing a challenge in 77% (17
of 22) of the TRIPS matters.40 The EU is the second biggest complainant,
filing challenges in 32% (7 of 22) of the TRIPS matters.41 Only two developing
countries (Brazil and India) have raised TRIPS challenges so far, which were
against the U.S. and the EU. 42 The large number of complaints by the U.S. and
EU is also reflected in WTO challenges generally. According to Leitner and
Lester's 2009 study, the U.S. brought the most WTO challenges (93,
representing 22% of challenges) in the WTO, while the EU, the second most
(81, representing 19%).43
Second, the EU has the most TRIPS challenges (at 5) against it, while the
U.S. has the second most at 4 challenges.44 A similar breakdown exists for all
WTO disputes; according to Leitner and Lester's survey, the U.S. has received
4 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
41 Id. The percentage with the U.S. is greater than 100 because several countries can bring
challenges in the same WTO matter.
42 Id
43 See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 207 (tbl. 1).
44 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
410 [Vol. 18:401
10
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/4
2011] MEASURING TRIPS COMPLLANTCE AND DEFIANCE
the most challenges at 108 (27/6), with the EU second at 67 (17/o).45 The
majority of TRIPS complaints have been against developed countries. Fifteen
of the 22 TRIPS disputes (68%) were against developed countries, while 7
(32%) were against developing countries. 46 Of the 15 matters against developed
countries, all but 2 were brought by developed countries. 47 Conversely, all of
the 7 disputes against developing countries were brought by developed
countries.48 In other words, the South countries have all refrained from
challenging each other's implementation of TRIPS. Thus, in the majority of
TRIPS challenges, the disputes involved the North versus the North, although
the North did go after the South in 7 disputes.
Third, the TRIPS challenges before the WTO are a "U.S.-EU show."
Remarkably, every single TRIPS challenge in the first fifteen years of the WTO
had either the U.S., EU, or both involved in the dispute either as a complainant
or respondent. 49 The heavy U.S. and EU involvement in TRIPS disputes is
consistent with their dominance in WTO disputes generally. From 1995 to
2009, 43.3% of the total WTO disputes involved either the U.S. or EU as
complainant, while 43.8% of the total WTO complaints involved either the U.S.
or EU as respondents.5 Fifty disputes pitted the U.S. and EU against each
other, 5 of which involved TRIPS disputes.51 More recent trends from 2005 to
2009 indicate, however, that the U.S. and EU have decreased their number of
WTO challenges, while developing countries have increased their challenges. 52
Also, China has become a more frequent participant in WTO disputes-mainly
as a respondent, but also as a complainant.53 Despite the recent trends, the
TRIPS disputes have been dominated by the U.S. and EU throughout the entire
period.
5. Time to Correct Violations. Finally, in terms of TRIPS compliance, all of the
offending countries in the seven disputes with a TRIPS violation-with the
notable exception of the U.S. in two of the disputes-enacted changes to their
laws to bring them into compliance. 54 The U.S. has not corrected its violations
45 See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 207 (tbl.2).
46 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
47 Id
48 Id
49 Id
50 See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 208.
5' Id. (50 disputes); Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30 (5 TRIPS disputes).
52 See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 208.
53 Id. at 216-17.
54 See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
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in the Section 110(5) and Havana Club Rum disputes.55 The average time it
took the offending countries, other than the U.S., to correct their violations was
less than a year (10.4 months) from the DSB's adoption of the WTO decision.
The breakdown by member and dispute is shown in the following table:
Thiu TAKEN BY MEMBER TO COMPLY WITH WTO DECISION
MEMBER AND DIspum TIME TO COMPLY
India - Pharmaceutical Patents ("mailbox rule") 15 months fixed
Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents 4 months fixed
Canada - Patent Term 9 months fixed
EU - Trademark and GIs 1 year fixed
China - IP Rights 1 year fixed
U.S. - Section 110(5) 10 years + counting*
U.S. - Havana Club Rum 9 years + counting*
Thus, with the exception of the U.S., members have corrected their TRIPS
violations within a short amount of time. Although the sample is small, 71% of
the TRIPS violations have been fully (and timely) corrected-a number that is
similar to Hudec's analysis of full correction in 68% of GATT disputes from
1948 to 1990.56 Davey estimates that, in the first ten years of the WTO,
successful implementation occurred in 83% of the disputes. 57
III. DEVELOPING THE TRIPS SCORECARD FOR COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE
The idea of a using a scorecard or rating system is, of course, not new to the
law or regulators-just think of the air quality index, credit ratings, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and the Human Development Index.58 Scholars,
5s See Current Status, United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyrght Act, WT/DS160; Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Sept. 21, 2010, 1 21-25, Meeting WT/DSB/M/287 (Nov. 5, 2010)
[hereinafter Sept. 2010 Minutes] (discussing unfixed status of Section 110(5)); Current Status,
United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appmpniations Act of 1998, WT/DS176; Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra,
TT 2-16 (discussing unfixed status of Section 211).
56 See EVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 278-79.
57 See William J. Davey, The WITO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 17, 47 (2005). The figures noted above from Hudec and Davey do not measure timeliness,
however. Davey's estimate based on four years of WTO decisions suggests that the overall
average time for implementation is over fifteen months. See id. at 49.
58 See U.S. Air Qualio Status and Trends Through 2008, 20 AIR POLLUTION CONSULTANT 1.4
(2010) (discussing air quality index); Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, 917
PLI/Comm 53, 58 (2009) (discussing credit ratings); Rosa Giovanna Barresi, The Impact of
Monetay Union and the Euro on European Capital Markets: What May Be Achieved in Capital Market
Integration, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1257, 1258 n.2 (2005) (discussing gross domestic product);
Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: StructuralAdjustment and the Case for National Enforcement
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too, have proposed scorecard or index systems to enhance our understanding
of various things, ranging from competitiveness in countries and intellectual
property enforcement, to the quality of life in countries and even judicial
rankings.59 Even within the WTO, the EU has proposed that the WTO
Secretariat use a "scorecard" to ensure transparency in country compliance with
any rule eventually adopted governing fisheries subsidies.60  As the EU
proposal suggests, a scorecard can provide greater transparency and attention to
compliance with treaty obligations, and it enables greater cross-country
comparisons on the same index. This Part proposes that the WTO utilize a
TRIPS Scorecard to monitor countries' corrections of any TRIPS violations
found by the DSB.
A. THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE
Before turning to the TRIPS Scorecard, it would be fruitful to put the
discussion of a compliance scorecard against the backdrop of the larger,
normative debate over (non)compliance with international law. Although it
goes beyond the scope of this Article to resolve this longstanding, if not never-
ending, debate, the theories are useful to frame the later discussion of the
Compliance Scorecard.
1. Noncompliance as Inevitable or Even Acceptable. A number of leading theorists
characterize the failure of member countries to correct their own violations of a
treaty as inevitable in an international system with political actors. The late
Robert Hudec was a leading advocate of this political realist view. Hudec
believed that international trade law was not immune from politics. 61 The
GATT dispute system would fail in so-called "wrong cases," Hudec wrote, in
of Economic and Social Rzghts, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 179-80 (1998) (discussing the
Human Development Index).
5 See IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard, http://www.imd.org/research/publications/
wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf (rating economic competitiveness in countries); Robert M.
Sherwood, Intellectual Propery Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen
Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 261 (1997) ("The rating system examines regime effectiveness
from the perspective of private investment stimulation, particularly national private investment.');
Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1304 (1994) (suggesting quality
of life index for countries); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation
Bias (as a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279 (2007) (ranking judges in terms of
bias).
60 See Derek J. Dostal, Global Fisheries Subsidies: Will the WFTO Reel in Effective Regulations, 26 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 815, 831 (2005).
61 See Robert E. Hudec, GAIT Dipute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159 (1980).
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which the political will of the countries to comply was lacking or diminished.62
One type of wrong case involves a country's "ordinary noncompliance" with a
treaty due to political expediency or special interest pressure in the country.63
No matter how elaborate the dispute settlement procedures, Hudec doubted
the ability of these procedures to discipline countries effectively because
compliance depends on the political will of countries to comply, in Hudec's
view. 64
In a prescient passage worth quoting at length, Hudec cautioned:
A third lesson suggested by the GATT's experience is that
political will is really more important than rigorously binding
procedures-that strong procedures by themselves are not likely
to make a legal system very effective if they do not have sufficient
political will behind them.... The current fascination with the
novel WTO procedures tends to obscure the importance of this
first and most important condition of success.
What can be said today about the political will behind the new
WTO system? Based on first impressions, the answer should
begin on a note of skepticism. Today's WTO governments are
the same governments, more or less, as the ones that stood
behind the old GATT disputes system. While those governments
did achieve a level of compliance that was exceptional by
international standards, their commitment was not strong enough
to deter occasional outbreaks of noncompliant behavior,
particularly among its leading citizens. The new WTO system
asks for a stronger political commitment because it sets the bar
higher. Yet it is difficult to identify any major changes in national
political life in the major WTO countries that will make their
political systems more receptive to WTO legal discipline than
they were in the decade or two before the WTO came into
being.65
As discussed in the next Parts, Hudec's prediction about noncompliance in
the WTO turned out to be prescient. Although Hudec was not sanguine about
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 See New WTO, supra note 19, at 11.
65 Id. at 11-12.
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the WTO's ability to prevent ordinary noncompliance by countries, he was no
advocate for acceptance of noncompliance. Instead, Hudec advised the WTO
to treat the failed legal ruling with persistence, patience and
practicality-the persistence of keeping the matter on its agenda,
the patience of doing so for what may be a long period of time,
and the practicality of fashioning eventual accommodations that
produce a result that can be said to be consistent with long-term
respect for GATT/WTO law.66
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner adopt a view of international law that treats
noncompliance as simply a byproduct of a country's self-interest. In their
rational choice theory, countries agree to international treaties out of their own
self-interest; thus, compliance ultimately depends on a country's own self-
interest in complying or not.67 Goldsmith and Posner's approach puts a more
positive-or at least political realist-gloss on a country's violation of a treaty.
While Hudec's approach highlights the lack of political will of a country,
Goldsmith and Posner's approach focuses on the reasons, based on raionality
and self-interest, for a country to choose to violate its treaty obligations.
Goldsmith and Posner do acknowledge, however, that more powerful countries
like the U.S. have a greater "freedom of action" to violate treaties than weaker
countries in the GATT/WTO system.68  A similar view of rational
noncompliance is taken by Judith Bello, specifically regarding the WTO. 69
2. Noncompliance as a Negative Violation to be Corrected. Another school of
thought views a country's violation of its treaty obligations as a negative that a
country should correct because treaties are legal obligations. Abram Chayes and
Antonia Handler Chayes argued that "[tihe norms established by treaties are
legal norms, at least in that they embody rules acknowledged in principle to be
66 Id. at 15.
67 JACK L. GoLDsMYTH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (2005).
68 Id. at 162.
69 See Judith Hippler Bello, The WITO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996) ("If the local politics du jour or changing economics require or merit it,
any WTO member may exercise its sovereignty and take action inconsistent with the WTO
Agreement, provided only that it compensates adversely affected trading partners or suffers
offsetting retaliation."). But see Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65
U. Prrr. L. REv. 763, 780-83 (2004) (criticizing Bello's argument); John H. Jackson, The WITO
Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
60 (1997) (same).
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legally binding on states that ratify them." 70 Moreover, "[t]he rule that 'every
treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be performed in good
faith,' codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
has long been recognized as a fundamental background norm of international
law."7 ' In short, international law functions as a rule of law.
Legal scholars who believe in the binding nature of international treaties
often take different views on how best to achieve treaty compliance. For
example, the Chayes believed that treaty noncompliance stems principally from
a country's "lack of capability or clarity or priority," and not from a country's
"willful disobedience." 72 They advised, therefore, not coercive sanctions for
treaty enforcement, but rather building member compliance through
"management" instruments of transparency, dispute settlement, capacity
building, and persuasion. 73 By contrast, Harold Koh argued that the key to
compliance is a country's "repeated participation in the transnational legal
process" by which a country will face "frictions" in reaction to its
noncompliance; over time, the country is likely to move "from one-time
grudging compliance with an external norm to habitual internalized
obedience." 74 Thomas Franck, by contrast, contended that treaty compliance is
best secured when countries view the international rules to be fair.75
The WTO adopts the view that treaty violations are negative occurrences
that should be corrected. The DSU states: "Prompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members."7 6 The DSU considers
that "[i]n the absence of a mutually agreed solution [between the countries], the
first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism" is the "secur[ing of] the
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with
the provisions of any of the covered agreements."77 As John Jackson explained,
the DSU "clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the
recommendation." 78
70 See ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 116 (1995).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 22.
73 Id. at 22-28.
74 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nadons Obey Internaional LIw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2655
(1997).
75 Id. at 2601-02 (discussing the argument made in THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
76 DSU, supra note 13, art. 21.1.
77 Id. art. 3.7.
78 See Jackson, supra note 69, at 63 (emphasis in original).
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With that in mind, this Article proceeds from the premise that the WTO, as
an institution, seeks countries' compliance with their WTO treaty obligations,
once a violation has been found in the DSB. Although the proposed Scorecard
does not mandate that countries adopt a certain view in this normative debate,
from the WTO's perspective, the Scorecard shares the view that WTO
violations are to be corrected. The viewpoint adopted herein is not meant to
favor a particular country or group of countries, but instead, to serve the WTO
as an institution. The next Section considers a better way for the WTO to keep
track of compliance.
B. THE TRIPS COMPLIANCE SCORECARD
The WTO website, administered by the WTO Secretariat, tracks every
dispute ever brought before the WTO, including, in the event of a violation, a
country's efforts to correct a law found by a WTO decision to be in violation of
a treaty obligation. But the WTO website does so in a way that is not all that
helpful.7 9 To be sure, a lot of information is presented on the WTO website,
but in ways that are not always easy to digest or understand. It offers too much
information and minutiae, without sufficient summaries or an overall view. The
information on the WTO website is dispersed across the individual web pages
for each dispute-meaning one cannot know the dispositions of all WTO
disputes, including countries' correction (or not) of violations, without clicking
on all the different links for the individual cases. In some instances, the
information does not appear to be current.8 o In short, the website is not user-
friendly or helpful for someone trying to get an overall picture of the DSB.
79 The WTO keeps track of such information on the specific webpage for each dispute
resolved by a panel decision under the heading of "Implementation Status of Adopted Reports."
See, e.g., United States-Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, supra note 55. Although the WTO website
allows searching by "current status" of disputes, the search result only lists dispute numbers of
the cases; one must click on each link in order to find description of the case and its status. See
Current Status of Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispucurrent-statu
s e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). Also, the WTO website posts minutes from DSB meetings in
which the status of some disputes and failures to correct violations is reported. See, e.g.,
Surveillance of Implementation of DSB Rulings, June 22, 2010, http://www.wto.org/english/ne
ws-e/newsl0_e/dsb_22junl(0e.htm. Finally, each year the WTO publishes an Annual Report
that discusses the status of open cases in the DSB. See, e.g., WTO Annual Report 2010, http://
www.wto.org/english/res-e/publications-e/anrepl0_e.htm. None of these materials provides
an easy-to-view summary of all uncorrected violations or how long they have remained so.
so See, e.g., Current Status, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft,
WT/DS222 (Mar. 18, 2003) (2003 report is last information on resolution of dispute without final
resolution).
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This Article proposes a better way: the tabulation of a TRIPS Compliance
Scorecard measuring a country's attempt to correct any treaty violation that a
WTO panel or the Appellate Body has found. On a single webpage, the WTO
would list the TRIPS Compliance Scorecards for all countries ever to be found
in violation of TRIPS. (Countries that had no such violations would not be
listed.) Through this webpage, the WTO and its members may make cross-
country comparisons and a more informed assessment of the effectiveness of
the DSB. A compliance scorecard arguably falls within the power of the WTO
Secretariat, which has the responsibility of providing "secretarial and technical
support" to WTO panels-a power that authorizes, for example, the
Secretariat's creation and maintenance of the WTO's current website for
dispute cases.81 A simple version of a scorecard would be a merely cosmetic
change to the current website-like rearranging furniture on the deck. To the
extent a more complex scorecard would require further DSB consideration, the
DSU arguably recognizes the power to use a scorecard under the broad
"surveillance" power granted to the DSB. 82 My proposal is for the WTO to
supplement the information currently on its website with a TRIPS Scorecard.
1. Why a Scorecard? Scholars and policymakers have increasingly analyzed
the effectiveness of the WTO as an institution by examining members'
compliance with their WTO obligations, especially through the dispute
settlement process. 83 To be sure, focusing on just dispute settlement cases is
deficient because it ignores compliance that routinely occurs outside the dispute
settlement process, such as in countries' enactment and enforcement of
81 See DSU, supra note 13, art. 27.1; Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispu e/find&dispucases-e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) ("This summary has
been prepared by the Secretariat under its own responsibility.").
82 Article 21.6 instructs that the "DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of
adopted recommendations or rulings." DSU, supra note 13, art. 21.6. A scorecard would be a
form of surveillance on such implementation. For further discussion of the authority of the
WTO to implement a scorecard, see infra Part V.A.2.
83 See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 405 (2003); Davey, supra note 3, at 119; Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compiance Through the WTO
Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 383 (2006); New
WITO, supra note 19, at 11; Sebastiaan Princen, EC Comphance ith WTO Law: The Interplay of Law
and Politics, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 555 (2004); C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons fmm the First
Decade of WTO Dipute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309 (2007); Carlos M. Vazquez &
John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with WPTO Dipute Settlement Dedsions, 33 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 555 (2002). The predecessor GATT system also elicited much study. See, e.g.,
William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATIT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Robert E. Hudec
et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1
(1993); Paul Rothstein, Note, Moting All-In with the World Trade Organization: Ignoring Adverse Rulings
and Gambling with the Future ofthe WPTO, 37 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151 (2008).
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intellectual property laws. Nonetheless, some benefit may be gained by looking
at how well countries have complied with their obligations in more
controversial areas that have led to WTO disputes. After all, the so-called
"crown jewel" of the WTO would be fool's gold if the DSB itself lacked
effective enforcement.
Good governance in the WTO requires transparency and access to
information related to WTO matters. 84 Such transparency is important to earn
the respect and trust of countries, individuals, NGOs, and other non-state
actors that are affected by WTO decisions.85 Indeed, the WTO already shares
this goal. As the Appellate Body has stated, Article X of GATT 1994
"embod[ies] a principle of fundamental importance-that of promoting full
disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and
enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality." 86 As the AB explained:
The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of
transparency and has obviously [sic} due process dimensions.
The essential implication is that Members and other persons
affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures
imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, should have a
reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures
and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or
alternatively to seek modification of such measures . . . .
Although Article X deals with transparency in member nations, the same
principle should apply generally to the WTO as an institution. Indeed, the
WTO would lose legitimacy if it required countries to follow good governance
principles that the WTO itself flouted. Accordingly, the current website of the
WTO publicly disseminates an incredible amount of information about WTO
decisions, consistent with this overriding goal of transparency. ,
More generally, scholars and regulators such as Cass Sunstein, now
Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
84 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Transpareng and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56
RUTGERS L. REv. 927, 928 (2004).
ss See Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO Debate and the Appropriate
Role for Non-State Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT'L L. 71, 101 (2009).
86 Appellate Body Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Undenear, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997) (discussing Art. X of GATT 1947).
87 Id. (emphasis added). For further discussion, see Padideh Ala'i, From the Penphery to the
Center? The Evolving WITO Juriprudence on Transpareng and Good Governance, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 779
(2008).
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Affairs, have recognized the importance of administrative bodies disseminating
information in formats people can easily understand and use.88 If we apply this
principle to the WTO, we find a chief defect in the WTO's website: it provides
too much information in piecemeal fashion without any accompanying overall
summary. The WTO website is like being stuck in a million trees, without any
view of the forest.
The proposed Scorecard would help to fix the WTO website by making it
more user-friendly. The Scorecard distills information from the WTO website
and winnows it down to a single table listing scores of country compliance with
DSB rulings. This Article proposes two options for the TRIPS Scorecard: (1) a
simple formula and (2) a complex formula. The WTO would select only one
type of Scorecard to use, although the underlying data used in the simple
formula might also be listed along with the Complex Scorecard."
2. Simple TRIPS Compliance Scorecard. One option for the WTO would be to
adopt a Simple TRIPS Compliance Scorecard. It would track two variables: (1)
the total number of a country's laws in violation of TRIPS found by the DSB,
and (2) the time a country takes to correct the violation. Zero (0) is a perfect
score for each country, representing no violations. For each violation
uncorrected, a negative number would be assigned. Thus, under this simple
approach, if County A has 3 laws in violation of TRIPS, its score would be -3.
Once a country corrects a violation, the number would decrease by one for
each violating law corrected. For example, if County A corrected 2 of its laws,
the score would improve to -1. The scores can be tabulated after the reasonable
time for implementation expired for a violating country, which would typically
allow at least a one-year grace period.
88 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 240 (2008) (In both the public and private sectors, a primary
goal should be to increase transparency."); The Power Bmkers: Cass Sunstein, Office of Infomaion and
Regulatory Afairs, BLOOMBERG BusINESSwEEK, Jan. 8, 2011, http://images.businessweek.com/sli
deshows/20110119/the-power-brokers/slides/2 ("Ideas he championed as a behavioral economics
advocate on the importance of disclosing information in readily understandable form are surfacing
in the regulatory world.").
89 One thing to avoid is using two "Scorecards," in order to avoid confusion, especially given
that the perfect scores are dramatically different between the two types of Scorecards (0 and 100).
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The Simple TRIPS Scorecard breaks down as follows:
TRIPS COMPLIANCE SCORECARD (SIMPLE) (jAN.2011)
MEMBER LIVE VIOLATIONS
United States -2
Canada 0
China 0
EU 0
India 0
The Simple TRIPS Scorecard can be broadened to include some measure of
the time a country in violation has taken before correcting the violation(s), as
depicted below:
TRIPS COMPLIANCE ScoREcARD (SIMPLE) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER LIVE VIOLATIONS YEARS TO COMPLY
United States -2 9 + 10 years + counting*
India 0 (15 months, 1 fixed)
Canada 0 (9 mos. + 6 mos., 2 fixed)
China 0 (1 year, 1 fixed)
EU 0 (1 year, 1 fixed)
The Simple TRIPS Scorecard shows that most of the violations were fixed
within a short amount of time. The U.S. still has not corrected its 2 violations
after 9 and 10 years counting, however.90
The two variables in the Simple Scorecard track two important values
recognized by the DSU. First, consistent with Article 3's recognition of the
"first objective" being the correction of the violation (absent a mutual
agreement),9 ' the Scorecard keeps track of live violations until they are
corrected. Second, consistent with Article 21's goal of compliance within a
"reasonable period of time,"92 the Scorecard monitors the time countries take
to comply with WTO decisions. 93
90 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing details of U.S. violations).
91 DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.7.
92 Id. art. 21.3(c).
93 The Simple Scorecard might also list other variables, such as: (1) total number of challenges
a country faced; (2) number of mutually agreed solutions, timely corrections of violations, and
disputes in which the country was found to have no violation at all (what I call "Good Behavior
Credit" in the next section); and (3) number of trade sanctions authorized (if any) against a
21
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Of course, some judgment would have to be made as to what constitutes a
"violation." My view is that the Scorecard should count the number of laws in
violation, not the number of treaty provisions violated. This avoids the potential
problem of "double counting" a law that may violate several provisions, such as
national treatment and most favored nation,94 which may sometimes overlap.
Consistent with the DSU's focus, the Scorecard tracks the number of laws that
need to be corrected. But does a law with two or more violating provisions
constitute one violation or several? For simplicity, my preference would be for
the WTO to treat all related provisions or laws as constituting one violation as
long as they all related to a common violation of a treaty provision. Also, my
proposal is guided by a principle of leniency and is designed to offer some
leniency to noncompliant countries in the calculation of their Scorecards.95 Thus,
in close cases, the principle of leniency would counsel the WTO to adopt the lower
number of violations for the Scorecard.
The Simple Scorecard might assign different points to violations depending
on whether they were major or minor-e.g., 2 for major violations, 1 for standard
violations, and .5 for mere technical or minor violations. For example, a violation
of national treatment (discriminating against foreign nationals96) could be treated
as a more serious violation than a violation of the "mailbox rule" for preserving
priority of patent applications during a developing country's transitional period.
However, I believe this approach is misguided. Especially for the Simple
Scorecard, the goal should be to minimize the need to make subjective judgments
in tallying up the scorecard. A bean counter should be able to perform the task.
3. Complex TRIPS Compliance Scorecard. The Simple Scorecard is easy to
formulate simply by listing raw numbers for live violations and years taken to
comply. An alternative approach would be to include both variables into a single
country. The danger of listing more variables, however, is that the scorecard may become too
complicated, defeating the purpose of the scorecard in the first place.
94 See TRIPS arts. 3-4.
5 This principle of leniency is not expressly discussed in the DSU, although the series of steps
delineated in the DSU to achieve a "positive solution"-with the "last resort" of trade
sanctions-do embody a lenient approach. See DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.7. Moreover,
customary international law recognizes the interpretive principle of dubio mitius under which an
ambiguous treaty provision is to be interpreted as creating a less onerous burden on the party in
question. See Carlos Manuel VAzquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WFTO: Some
Similarities and Diferences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 587, 604-05 (2004). Likewise, the rule of
lenity favors a similar approach in the context of international criminal law. See Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guily Associations: Joint Criminal Enterpise, Command Responsibility, and
the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 84-85 (2005). The WTO's Anti-
Dumping Agreement follows a similar approach in Article 17.6. See Vazquez, supra, at 604-05.
96 See Thomas Cortier & Markus Krajewsi, What Role for Non-Discrimination and Prudential
Standards in International Financial Law, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L. 817, 819-21 (2010).
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number along a scale measuring overall compliance with WTO decisions
involving TRIPS. This approach is what I call the Complex TRIPS Compliance
Scorecard.
The Complex Scorecard can provide a clearer indicator of a country's overall
performance or compliance in the DSB by reducing it into a single number, much
in the same way GDP indicates national economic growth,97 or GPA or grade
point average informs students of their overall performance in school. If the
overall score is easy to understand (e.g., getting a 4.0 in school is excellent), then
this score is better as an overall indicator of performance than just looking at the
individual raw scores. Another advantage with this approach is that the WTO
can weigh the variables and include other variables in the computation of the
complex score in a way that signals the WTO's view of the importance of a
variable. For example, as proposed below, the formula can be devised to weigh
more negatively a country with multiple uncorrected violations versus a single
uncorrected violation-the basic premise being that a first offense is not as bad as
multiple offenses.98 On the other hand, the Complex Scorecard has tradeoffs.
Adding and weighting more variables in the Scorecard may bring greater
complexity and controversy. Too much complexity or controversy would defeat
the whole purpose of transparency in the Scorecard.
a. The Basic Formula. With that caveat in mind, I offer a basic formula for
the proposed Complex TRIPS Scorecard, followed by optional variables that may
be added if so preferred. The basic formula is as follows:
Complex Compliance Score = 100 - x (yi +y2+y3 +...)
One hundred represents the perfect score of compliance following an
adverse WTO decision against a country. X represents the number of laws in a
9 See Sunstein, supra note 59, at 1304-08.
98 It goes beyond this Article's scope to provide a full discussion of this principle. The
principle has applications in both national and international law. For example, in criminal law,
treating multiple and repeat offenses more severely is a common principle in many Western
countries, including the United States. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the
Sentencing Process, 22 CuIE & JusT. 303 (1997). The principle also is common in copyright
infringement policies and laws, sometimes called the "graduated response" or "three strikes law"
that require termination of Internet accounts for "repeat infringers." See David W. Quist, Three
Strikes and You're Out: A Survy of Foreign Approaches to Preventing Copynght Infringement on the Internet,
66 Bus. LAW. 261 (2010); Peter IC Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1373 (2010). The
U.S. DMCA safe harbor follows this approach. See 17 U.S.C. 5 512(i)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring
implementation of repeat infringer policy). In international law, the principle of "cessation and
non-repetition" of wrongful acts is meant to deter repeat violations by a country. See Cho, supra
note 69, at 771-72 n.39.
423
23
Lee: Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance Score
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2011
J. INTELL PROP. L
country still in violation. For each law in violation, Y represents the number of
years after a final WTO decision in which the law has not been corrected. Only
uncorrected violations are included in the calculation. As with the Simple
Scorecard, only countries that had received adverse decisions from the DSB
would be listed on the Complex Scorecard.
Under the above formula, a country loses its perfect score of compliance
(100) as soon as it has an uncorrected violation that has lasted a year or longer
after the WTO decision. Before a year has elapsed, however, the country would
still have a perfect score of 100. Thus, the country effectively has a one-year
grace period, from the date the DSB adopts the decision, in which to comply
with the WTO recommendations before the country loses its perfect
compliance score of 100. The formula can be altered to give a greater grace
period, such as 2 or 3 years, in order to accommodate perceived difficulties or
political realities of enacting legislation. However, I have chosen to use one
year as the default grace period because it is a common "reasonable period of
time" used in WTO disputes,99 and because countries with TRIPS violations
have, for the most part, corrected their violations within a year. 00
To get an idea of how the Complex Scorecard works, imagine that Country A
had 1 violation that had not been corrected for 1 year. Country A would receive
a score of 99. Each year thereafter, the score decreases by 1 as depicted for the
first ten years of noncompliance on the diagram below.
SAMPLE COMPLIANCE SCORECARD FOR MEMBER WITH 1 VIOLATION
LivE VIOLATIONS YEARS IN VIOLATION SCORE
1 1 99
1 2 98
1 3 97
1 4 96
1 5 95
1 6 94
1 7 93
1 8 92
1 9 91
1 10 90
9 See, e.g., Current Status, China-Measures Affeting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Properly Rights, WT/DS362 (concluding twelve months was a reasonable period of time); United
States-Section 110(5) of US Copynght Act, supra note 55 (finding twelve months, rather than fifteen,
to be a reasonable period of time).
100 See supra Part II.B.5.
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Consistent with a principle of leniency, the scoring system is lenient on what
might be likened to "first-time offenders" or the "first offense." A country
with only 1 uncorrected violation may still maintain a high compliance score,
even after many years of failing to correct that single violation. Each year of
noncompliance decreases the overall score only by 1. A country could maintain
a positive score even with 99 years of noncompliance.
However, the Scorecard treats more severely countries that have multiple
laws in violation of treaty obligations. Under the formula, the number of
violations is multiplied by the sum of the number of years a country has failed
to correct each violation. The "multiplier effect" here produces a lower
compliance score for a country that has multiple violations uncorrected versus a
country that has only a single violation. For example, if County B had 2
violations that were each uncorrected for just 2 years, County B would receive a
compliance score of 92. By contrast, because CountU A had only 1 violation, it
would receive a score of 92 only after 8 years of noncompliance.
SAMPLEF SCO0REC,(_ARD FOR MnEWIH2 VIOLATONs'
LIVE VIOLATIONS YEARS IN VIOLATION SCORE
2 1 96
2 2 92
2 3 88
2 4 84
2 5 80
2 6 76
2 7 72
2 8 68
2 9 64
2 10 60
After year 10 of noncompliance, CountU B would receive a compliance score
of 60 for its 2 violations-which is much worse than CountU A's score of 90
after year 10 for only 1 violation. The reason for the disparity is the multiplier
effect. For two violations uncorrected for the same length, each year of
noncompliance decreases the overall score by a factor of four. For three
violations, by a factor of nine. For four violations, by a factor of sixteen, etc.
The basic idea behind the multiplier effect is that the leniency afforded to a
country with outstanding violations under the Scorecard should decrease, by a
larger degree, with each additional violation committed.
4252011]
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Using this formula, the compliance scores in January 2011 for countries with
past TRIPS violations in the DSB are:
TRIPS CoMPLIANcE ScoREcARD (COMPLEX) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
Canada 100
China 100
EU 100
India 100
United States 62
The U.S. score was determined as follows: 100 - 2 violations (10 years + 9
years) = 62. Bear in mind: the U.S. can dramatically improve its score simply by
correcting one of the violations. For example, should the U.S. correct its
longest standing violation in the Section 110(5) case, the U.S. compliance score
would jump nearly 30 points to 91, even though the U.S. still had one TRIPS
violation outstanding.
b. The Trade Sanction Mulplier. The basic formula of the TRIPS
Compliance Scorecard can include other variables. One option would be to
include a multiplier to the computation for years of delay in those disputes in
which the respondent country obtains WTO authorization of the ultimate
penalty of trade sanctions against a violating country.10  Thus, below, S
represents the multiplier for trade sanctions:
Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions = 100 - x (y;S +y2 +y3 +...)
For each dispute involving trade sanctions, the years uncorrected (Y) is
multiplied by the trade sanction multiplier (S).
For example, the trade sanction multiplier might be 3, a number used
sometimes in national disputes for the trebling of awards or penalties for more
severe offenses. If CountU C was subject to trade sanctions in the WTO for 1
violation that had gone uncorrected for 10 years, CountU C would receive a
compliance score of 70. After year 11, the compliance score would drop to 67.
And, if CountU C had another violation that was not corrected for over 1 year
(but without trade sanctions), County Cs score would worsen even more. For
example, if County C had 1 violation uncorrected for over 13 years that was
subject to trade sanctions, and a second violation uncorrected for 1 year but
without trade sanctions, CountU Cs compliance score would drop to 20.102
101 See DSU art. 22.
102 The number is determined as follows: 100 - 2((13 x 3) + 1) = 20.
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The theory behind the trade sanction multiplier is that the DSB's
authorization of a trade sanction against a violating country-the WTO's
ultimate penalty-should factor negatively in the country's Compliance
Scorecard. Like the authorization of trade sanctions, the multiplier signals that
the complainant country is dissatisfied with the violator's continued
noncompliance, and that the violator has not complied with the DSB's
recommendations within a reasonable time. However, some may view the trade
sanction multiplier as inappropriate because it ignores the positive benefits that
may be obtained from trade sanctions. As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan has
argued, because the authorization of trade sanctions is tied to a level "equivalent
to the level of nullification or impairment" suffered by the complainant
country,103 trade sanctions can be seen as positive "re-balancing [of] the level of
bilateral WTO commitments between the two countries."104 This rebalancing
may be seen as a positive remedy or process in its own right, instead of simply a
means to induce compliance. 0 5 In such case, using a trade sanction multiplier
may be considered unduly severe in treating what may be a positive
development.
On the other hand, the DSU prioritizes the country's removal of its
offending law as "the first objective" outside of a mutually agreed solution and
indicates that the "last resort" of trade sanctions are "temporary and shall only
be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent ... has been
removed," or the member otherwise resolves the nullification of benefits or
reaches a mutually agreed solution. 0 6 The hierarchy of measures under the
DSU prioritizes compliance with WTO agreements over other possible goals,
such as rebalancing. Every violation of the WTO agreements seeks compliance
with DSB recommendations, but very few disputes have involved trade
sanctions-and the putative possibility of rebalancing that may accrue.
Moreover, the WTO's authorization of the "last resort" of trade sanctions
against a violating country is not typically haled as a positive development in the
WTO, but rather, the opposite. 07
c. The Good Behavior Credit. Conversely, credit for "good behavior" can be
included in the Complex Compliance Scorecard for positive actions by a
country, including: (i) promptly correcting a past violation within the reasonable
time for implementation, (ii) reaching mutually agreed solutions in other
103 DSU, supra note 13, art. 22.4.
104 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS
Obligations, II J. INT'L ECON. L. 313, 325-26 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
05 Id.
106 See DSU, supra note 13, arts. 3.7, 22.8.
107 See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WITO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 792, n.2 (2001).
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disputes, or (iii) successfully defending itself from a challenge by a WTO finding
of no violation.
For example, if a country had corrected a violation within a reasonable time,
we might give, let's say, 3 bonus points or good behavior credits to the
Compliance Score to help offset any ongoing violations.108 Likewise, because
the DSU prefers that countries reach mutually acceptable solutions instead of
litigating WTO challenges, good credits might be given to any respondent that
reaches a mutually agreed solution following a challenge to its law.109 In the
equation below, Good Behavior Credit (G) would equal three times the total
number of timely implementations, mutually agreed solutions, and successful
defenses the country had.
Compliance Score with Good Behavior = 100 - x (yS +j2 +y3 +.. .) + G
With good behavior credit, the Complex TRIPS Compliance Scorecard
would be:
TRIPS COMPLIANCE SCORECARD (COMPLEX + GOOD BEHAVIOR CREDIT)
(JAN.2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
Canada 100
China 100
EU 100
India 100
United States 65
Notice the U.S. score improves slightly from 62 to 65, receiving good credit
in one TRIPS dispute. 10 (More dramatic improvement occurs in the U.S. trade
disputes, as discussed in Part IV below.)
d. Multliers for Developed v. Developing Countries. Finally, another option
would be to include a multiplier for developed countries, based in part on the
108 If a country had no live violations, its score would return to 100; the good behavior credit
would not be "banked," at least not until a live violation was in play.
109 See DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.7.
110 See Current Status, United States-US Patent Code, WT/DS224 (Jan 31, 2001). Although the
dispute is not formally reported as settled on the WTO website, a case brought by the U.S.
against Brazil is. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Bra#l--Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001). Both the U.S. and Brazil agreed not to pursue the
challenges against each other in the two disputes. Another good credit perhaps may be given to
the U.S. for the EU's challenge in another dispute. Current Status, Section 337 of the TariffAct of
1930 and Amendments thereto, WT/DS1 86, although the WTO does not indicate any resolution to
the challenge.
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assumption that developed countries have greater resources to protect and
enforce intellectual property, and, therefore, should serve as a greater example
for other countries. To some extent, TRIPS already recognizes this assumption
in the transitional provisions afforded to developing and least developed
countries." In the formula below, D represents the multiplier for a developed
country with a TRIPS violation.
Compliance Score = 100 - x {yi +y2 +y +. . )D
If the multiplier were 1.5, the U.S. compliance score would be 43 instead of
62.112
Alternatively, instead of a developed country multiplier, we can include a
discount for developing countries. For example, the discount multiplier might
be .5, effectively giving a developing country twice the time a developed country
has before receiving the same compliance score. A developing country with 1
live violation for 10 years would receive a compliance score of 95 (instead of 90
for a developed country in the same scenario).
C. THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIPS COMPLIANCE SCORECARD
Some may question the validity or usefulness of the scores computed under
my formula, either the simple or the complex scores. In January 2011, the U.S.
scored the worst of all WTO countries on the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard
using either formula-which runs counter to the popular perception that the
U.S. is a leading nation for the protection of IP.113 Conversely, China receives a
perfect score under my formula based on its correction of its TRIPS
violations-which, again, runs counter to the popular perception that China is
the largest source of counterfeit goods and pirated works in the world.114 The
"disconnect" between the scores and popular perception over IP protection
may lead some to doubt the usefulness of the Scorecard.
111 See TRIPS arts. 65-66 (transitional provisions; least-developed countries); DSU, supra note
13, art. 24 (special procedures for least-developed countries).
112 The U.S. score would be determined as follows: 100 - 2(10 + 9)1.5 = 43.
113 See Opening Statement of Ambassador Miriam E. Sapiro, Deputy United States Trade
Representative, World Intellectual Property Day, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, April 26, 2010,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2 0 10/april/remark
s-ambassador-sapiro-world-intellectual-p.
114 See Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a Flawed
Approach Is Making Counterfeiing Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 749, 752-53 n.9 (2010) (quoting an
estimate that 80% of all counterfeited and infringing goods in the world originated in China).
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My response is threefold. First, it is important to keep in mind that the
Scorecard is not a general indicator of overall IP enforcement in a country.
Instead, it is a measure of a country's compliance with TRIPS where a violation
has been adjudged by the WTO-a circumstance that can be objectively
determined with certainty. TRIPS imposes certain minimum standards for
intellectual property protection, but it does not necessarily ensure the high level
of protection or enforcement commonly expected in (Western) media accounts
of IP controversies between countries.' 5 Thus, the limitations of the Scorecard
may reflect the limitations of TRIPS or WTO generally. The U.S. efforts to
obtain "TRIPS-plus" protections against counterfeiting and piracy in the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Act (ACTA) and other FTAs-all outside the WTO-
provide some support for this conclusion." 6
While the WTO might consider a more comprehensive scorecard for issues
of compliance outside of the DSB, developing a scorecard within the DSB for
WTO disputes is helpful-at least as a first step-for the institution. Though
limited, focusing on WTO disputes removes the possibility of disagreement or
speculation over whether a TRIPS violation has occurred. Instead of
perceptions or subjective views on IP enforcement, the Scorecard focuses on
known WTO-determined violations.'17 Study of these known violations is
fruitful for analyzing the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement process.
An analogy might help explain why this is so. Imagine two taxpayers, Al and
Sally. People perceived Al as a tax evader, but Sally, a model tax payer and
citizen. Later, the IRS found both Al and Sally had delinquent taxes. Al quickly
paid his delinquent taxes, but Sally didn't. Measuring compliance here is still
valuable for the IRS, notwithstanding the possibility that Al is, in fact, a more
egregious tax evader than Sally. The IRS seeks compliance with all of its
judgments. Just because Sally may be more of a model citizen, that does not
mean she should be given a free pass from the IRS.
Second, it is important to evaluate the merits of the Scorecard from the
perspective of the institution of the WTO. The goal of the Scorecard is not
meant to favor or embarrass any particular country, whether it be the U.S., EU,
1s See Ruth L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute
Settlement, 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 42, 51-52 (E. Kwan Choi & James C.
Hartigan eds., 2003) (discussing "wiggle room" in standards of TRIPS).
116 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles'Heel 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479 (2011).
117 The U.S. may well be a million times better in protecting IP than China. But unless or until
the WTO finds a TRIPS violation, we have no way of knowing with certainty whether a country
is failing to abide by its obligations under TRIPS. Presumably, a country's laws have been
thoroughly vetted by the WTO TRIPS Council. And one would expect that any egregious
violation that survived such vetting would soon face a challenge in the dispute settlement process.
TRIPS art. 71.
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China, or another country. WITO justice should be blind to the country before
it. It would be a huge mistake to evaluate the idea of using a scorecard based
on the particular scores of countries at a certain time. The scores are likely to
change over time, as some violations are corrected and new disputes are
brought. The right question to ask is whether the tabulation of a Compliance
Scorecard is helpful to the WTO's surveillance of disputes, not whether we like
the scores of particular countries now.
Finally, to the extent the U.S., the EU, or other countries with uncorrected
violations feel any discomfort with their Scorecards, that reaction would be a
compelling argument in favor of the WTO's use of the Scorecard. If countries
feel any pressure to correct their violations because of the greater transparency
provided by the Scorecard, then it would serve the DSB's objective in securing
prompt compliance with WTO decisions. There is a danger that the continued,
prolonged violations that have gone uncorrected may draw greater resentment
by other WTO countries and undermine the overall effectiveness of the
WTO.I8 As a representative of Japan admonished recently, "full and prompt
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings was 'essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance of
the rights and obligations of Members.' "19
IV. SUPPLEMENTING THE TRIPS SCORECARD WITH OTHER MEASURES
The proposed TRIPS Scorecard is offered as a simple way for the WTO to
keep better track of and to provide greater transparency to, if not pressure on,
countries' compliance with TRIPS in cases of violations determined by the
DSB. This Part offers several other options that can work in tandem with the
TRIPS Scorecard.
A. SCORECARDS FOR OTHER WTO VIOLATIONS
Separate compliance scorecards can be formulated for other WTO
disciplines, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
118 At a meeting of the DSB in September 2010, numerous countries expressed discontent, and
near exasperation, with the longstanding WTO violations by the U.S. See Sept. 2010 Minutes,
supra note 55, iJ 5-17, 20 (Cuba, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, China, Argentina, Nicaragua,
Mexico, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Japan voicing sharp dissatisfaction with the U.S.'s failure
to correct its violations).
119 Id. 20 (quoting DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.3).
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1994),120 the Anti-Dumping Agreement,121 and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS).122 Likewise, an aggregate scorecard-or a master
scorecard-can be created for each country's compliance with all WTO
agreements. Computing scorecards in these other areas may provide a more
complete picture of a country's compliance record, including compliance with
intellectual property laws, as some of the disputes under GATT, for instance,
may well relate to IP.123
Because most of the other WTO agreements focus on trade, I will lump
them all together in one Trade Compliance Scorecard-in part for simplicity.
(Of course, individual scorecards can be made for each WTO agreement.) The
simple Trade Compliance Scorecard breaks down as follows for the same
countries listed on the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard above:
TRADE COMPLIANCE SCOREcARD (SiMPLE) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER LivE VIOLATIONS YEARS TO COMPLY
U.S. -5 9 + 8 + 5 + 5 + 4 years + counting
EU -3 13 + 12 + 4 years + counting*
Canada 0 (3 years 8 mos. + 10 mos. + 8 mos., 3 fixed)
China 0 (1 year + 9 mos., 2 fixed)
India 0 (19 mos. + 5 mos., 2 fixed)
As indicated, the EU and U.S. have multiple uncorrected trade violations.
The U.S. has 5 uncorrected trade violations; 124 the EU, 3.125
120 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
121 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 (1994).
122 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 B, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1993). All of the WTO agreements are summarized on the WTO website. See
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto.e/whatis-e/tif
_e/agrml-e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
123 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rigbts and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 125, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21,
2009) (GATT and GATS violations in China's law "relating to the importation into China,
and/or distribution within China, of certain products consisting of reading materials, audiovisual
products, sound recordings, and films for theatrical release").
124 The U.S.'s five outstanding trade violations in January 2011 were: (1) Appellate Body
Report, United States-Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001) (DSB adopted Aug. 23, 2001); (2) Appellate Body Report,
United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R,
WT/DS234/AB/R (an. 16, 2003) (DSB adopted Jan. 27, 2003); (3) Appellate Body Report,
United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) (DSB adopted March
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Several caveats should be noted. First, the WTO website may not be
entirely up-to-date, so my numbers may be affected by inaccuracies in the WTO
reporting. Second, for the U.S., I have counted as just 1 violation the 4 disputes
(DS322, DS344, DS350, DS294) involving the U.S. "zeroing" regulations and
methodology for computing antidumping duties, and have measured the
violation from the earliest of the 4 disputes.126 I have also included the U.S.
Byrd Amendment dispute as a live violation for the U.S., even though the U.S.
repealed the law by passage of the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act.127 In September
2010, the EU, Japan, and other countries complained to the DSB that the U.S.
was still continuing to issue disbursements under the Byrd Amendment, so the
dispute does not appear to be entirely resolved.128 On the other hand, for
21, 2005); (4) Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Beting Serices, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (DSB adopted April 20, 2005); (5)
Appellate Body Report, United States-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins ("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R (April 18, 2006) (DSB adopted May 9, 2006); Appellate
Body Report, United States- Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan.
9, 2007) (DSB adopted Jan. 23, 2007); Appellate Body Report, United States-FinalAnti-Dumping
Measures on Stainless Steelfom Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) (DSB adopted May 20,
2008).
125 The EU's three outstanding trade violations in Jan. 2011 were in: (1) Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (DSB adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EC Hormones]; (2)
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (DSB adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC
Bananas]; (3) Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (DSB adopted
Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter EC Biotech]. I did not include the EU zeroing case as a live violation.
Although the WTO website does not indicate correction, the EU reportedly abandoned the
zeroing practice. See Current Status, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-
!pe Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/d
sl41.e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); see also Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitution Lawmaking, 31 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 621 (2010) ("[A]lthough the EU was one of the long-standing users of the zeroing
practice, it has boldly changed its policy direction in a way that fully conforms to the AB's ruling
since it lost the very first case in EC--Bed Linen.").
126 See supra note 124. Zeroing, which is the subject of ten WTO disputes, is a controversial
method to calculate dumping margins, meaning the difference in price a producer charges for
exports of goods to foreign markets, typically at prices below domestic prices or fair market value.
Under the zeroing method, the margin is treated as zero (0)-instead of a negative margin-when
export price is actually higher than the average domestic value. This methodology favors the
importing country in its ability to impose antidumping duties because negative margins are
ignored in calculating dumping margins-making it easier to find a positive dumping margin
against an exporting country. See generaly Mitsuo Matsushita, Some International and Domestic
Antidumping Issues, 5 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 249 (2010).
127 See Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, 1 51.
128 See id. 1 42-50.
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Canada, I have not included Canada's violation in the Regional Aircraft dispute
as a live violation; although no official resolution is reported by the WTO, the
dispute with Brazil appears to have been resolved.129
Another caveat is that some of the live violations included in the Scorecard
may be near settlement. Should some of these disputes settle, the scores may
improve significantly. The EU has negotiated possible settlements for all 3 of
its live violations, although the settlements were not yet permanent or
completely resolved.130 Likewise, the U.S. has corrected some, but not all of its
violations in one dispute.131 And in the Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS267)
dispute, the U.S. reached a Framework for Mutually Agreed Solution that was
announced to the WTO in August 2010; although the Framework is not itself a
final resolution, it appears to be moving substantially toward that end.132
Although one might argue that these near settlements should not be included in
the negative category in the Scorecard because they show positive
129 The WTO website does not list a resolution to Canada's longstanding dispute with Brazil
over subsidies for regional aircraft. See Current Status, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees
for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222 (Mar. 18, 2008); see also Current Status, Bra#i--Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46 (Aug. 23, 2011). Apparently, the disagreement between Canada
and Brazil over credits in the regional aircraft sector was resolved by revisions to the OECD
Arrangement and a new Sector Understanding on Civil Aircraft. See Dominic Coppens, How
Much Credit for Export Credit Support Under the SCM Agreement?, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 63, 75 (2009).
Given the lack of clarity, I have not listed this dispute-or the earlier aircraft disputes with
Canada, DS70 and DS71-in the time for implementation category. For similar reasons, I have
not included DS321 involving Canada's trade sanctions against the EU in the Hormones dispute.
130 In EC Bananas, supra note 125, the WTO Annual Report indicated that, in December 2009,
the EU had reached a settlement with Latin American countries and was close to one with the
U.S. See W'TO Annual Report 2010, supra note 79, at 84. However, no final settlement of the
dispute has been reported. See Current Status, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27 (Dec. 11, 2008); William Schomberg, EU Backs Mandleson at
IVTO Talks, Despite France, NAT'L POST, July 26, 2008, http://www.nationalpost.com/news/wo
rld/story.html?id=53577e94-00=29-405f-813a-22249e365155 ("Other issues which remain to be
resolved include a decades-old row about trade in bananas .. ). In EC Hormones, supra note 125,
the EU and U.S. reached in 2010 a temporary, four-year agreement that might lead to a
permanent resolution. See Riccardo Pavoni, Mutual Supportiveness as a Prinple of Interpretation and
Law-Making: A Watershed for the "WTO-and-Compeding-Regimes" Debate?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649,
676-77 (2010). Likewise, in EC Biotech, supra note 125, the EU and U.S. negotiated an agreement,
although the U.S. has expressed dissatisfaction with the EU's implementation. See Sept. 2010
Minutes, supra note 55, 28 (U.S. contends "the EU had not resolved the fundamental problems
in the operation of its regulatory system for biotech products").
131 See Current Status, United States-Ani-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WT/DS1 84 (Aug. 23, 2011); Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, 19.
132 See Current Status, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS26 (Nov. 19, 2009)
(reporting Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute); Framework for a
Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization (WT/DS267),
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1996.
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developments in the disputes, I have chosen to include them. There is no
guarantee the disputes are going to be resolved, and it is probably better to
avoid making difficult judgment calls in these disputes.
Finally, since my tabulations were made in January 2011, the time for China
to implement a correction in the A/V dispute has since lapsed on March 19,
2011.133 However, in order to maintain consistency of time period in all the
scores, I have not included the recent uncorrected violation in China's score.
(Including the violation would decrease China's score only by 1.)
Using the complex formula, 134 the Trade Compliance Scorecard would yield
the following scores:
TRADE COMPUIANCE SCOP u7 ARD (COCMPLEX) (lAN. 201:1)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 100
India 100
Canada 100
EU 13
United States -55
Unlike the TRIPS disputes, the trade disputes have involved the WTO's
authorization of the penalty of trade sanctions in some instances. If we include
a trade sanction multiplier of 3 in the formula, 35 the scores for the U.S. and EU
worsen. Because sanctions were authorized against the U.S. in the Byrd
Amendment dispute, the U.S. compliance score would drop from -55 to -135.136
The EU fares even worse. It has been subject to trade sanctions in 2
longstanding disputes (EC-Bananas and EC-Hormones), which drops the EU's
133 See Current Status, China-Measures Affecting Trade Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications andAudionisualEntertainment Products, WT/DS363 (Jan. 19, 2010).
134 Compliance Score = 100 - x (y, +y2 +y3 +. . ).
135 Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions = 100 - x {yiS +y2 +/y3 + . .
136 See Current Status, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217
(Dec. 17, 2009) (authorization of Brazil, EU, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico suspension of
concessions to U.S. on Nov. 26, 2004, and Chile suspension on Dec. 17, 2004). 1 did not use the
trade sanction multiplier for the U.S. dispute with Antigua related to gambling. Even though an
arbitrator determined that Antigua may request trade sanctions in U.S.$21 million annually,
Antigua said it would rather pursue a mutually agreed solution. See Current Status, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sppy of Gambing and Betting Services, WT/DS285 (Dec. 21, 2007);
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: U.S. COMPLIANCE IN
PENDING CASES 47 (Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing how Antigua was attempting to reach a mutual
agreement with U.S.). Likewise, the Upland Cottons dispute with Brazil involved sanctions that
were authorized against the U.S., but Brazil chose instead to agree to a Framework toward a
mutually agreed settlement. See supra note 132.
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score from -13 to -137.137 Notice that, given the trade sanction multiplier, the
EU score falls below even the U.S., even though the U.S. has more violations.
TRADE COMPLIANCE SCORECARD (COMPLEX + TRADE SANCTIONS) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 100
India 100
Canada 100
United States -135
EU -137
We also might add Good Behavior Credit (of, say, 3 points) for each of
those disputes in which respondents reached a mutually agreed solution before
any WTO decision, successfully received a finding of no violation at all in a
WTO decision, or corrected a violation within the reasonable time for
implementation. 38 In order to earn Good Behavior Credit, the country must
report either the solution or the timely implementation to the DSB.39 With the
Good Behavior Credit, the U.S.' and EU's scores improve as follows:
13 See EC Hormones, supra note 125 (authorization of U.S. and Canada suspension of
concessions to EU on July 26, 1999); EC Bananas, supra note 125 (authorization of U.S.
suspension of concessions to EU on April 19, 1999, and Ecuador suspension of concessions to
EU on May 18, 2000).
138 Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions and Good Behavior Credit = 100 - x (yIS +y2 +y3
+. .. ) + G.
139 See generall DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.6 ("Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally
raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions .. . shall be notified to the
DSB.. . .'). For Good Behavior Credit, I did not count a settlement or implementation unless
listed on the WTO website. If several disputes all related to the same matter, I counted that as
just one matter for the purposes of the Scorecard, even if the country settled the dispute with
several countries. I gave full credit for settlements achieved with some, but not all, complainant
countries, and for disputes in which the complainant requested the DSB to terminate the
challenge. However, I did not give credit for disputes that were reported in consultations, but
without any further resolution. Nor did I give credit for a violator's partial correction of the
problem that still required DSB activity after the reasonable time for implementation. Finally, my
data are limited by what the WTO website reported. Thus, to the extent the WTO website failed
to indicate a settlement or implementation that a respondent country had successfully reported to
the WTO, my Scorecard did not attempt to correct any WTO error.
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TRADE COMPLIANCE SCORECARD (COMPLEX + TRADE SANCnONs + GooD BEHAVIOR
CREDIT AN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 100
India 100
Canada 100
United States -30
EU -83
The U.S. did particularly well, receiving Good Behavior Credit for 14 timely
corrections of violations, 15 mutually agreed settlements or terminations of
disputes, and 6 findings of no violations at all in a dispute, for a total of 105
Good Behavior Credits. 140 That elevates the U.S. score closer to positive
territory, at -30, up from -135. The EU received Credit for timely correcting 7
violations, reaching mutually agreed settlements or terminations in 10 cases, and
succeeding as respondent in 1 dispute with a finding of no violation, for 54
Good Behavior Credits and an overall score of -83, up from -137.141
B. TYING SCORES TO REMEDIES OR PENALTIES
Another option worth exploring would be for the WTO to tie the
Compliance Scorecard to some greater remedy or penalty against the violating
country. In addition to transparency in tracking a country's compliance, the
Scorecard might be given greater consequence. Such action would likely require
the WTO's amendment of the DSU, which would require the difficult task of
garnering a consensus in the WTO.142 Of course, WTO countries would have
to debate whether or not to pursue such an approach. I will not attempt here
to conduct that debate. But assuming such a proposal is considered desirable,
140 See 2011 Data for U.S. in WTO Disputes (on file with author). In some disputes involving
the U.S. (DS206, DS296, DS335, DS343, and DS383), the WTO website indicated U.S.
implementation, but without giving the actual date of implementation. It turns out four of those
five disputes were timely implementations by the U.S., but one (DS206) was not. See id. I also
included DS99 (DRAMS from Korea) as timely implemented, even though Korea initially
disputed the U.S. claim (but later did not protest). See Current Status, United States-And-Dumping
Duty on Random Access Memoy Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea,
WT/DS99 (Oct. 20, 2000).
141 See 2011 Data for EU in WTO Disputes (on file with author). I included DS290 (GIs) as
timely implemented even though Australia and the U.S. initially disputed the EU's claim (but later
did not protest). See Current Status, Eumpean Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290 (Apr. 21, 2006).
142 See Final Act, supra note 122, art. X.8 ("The decision to approve amendments to the
Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 2 shall be made by consensus and these amendments
shall take effect for all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference.").
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one possible amendment could be to trigger a penalty based on a country's
reaching a certain low score of (non)compliance.
For example, the DSU might be amended to contain a provision that denied
a country the ability to bring a WTO challenge should it go below an acceptable
score. The basic notion of this procedural penalty would rest on a theory of
"unclean hands"' 43 -i.e., a country with too many uncorrected violations itself
could not challenge other countries in the WTO for alleged violations. The
policy might be characterized as a "don't fix, don't challenge" policy.
The threshold for a country to lose its ability to challenge could be made
strict or lenient. A lenient approach might set the threshold at a negative
number on the Compliance Scorecard, effectively allowing a country to lose 100
points before suffering any penalty. For example, the "unclean hands" penalty
can be tailored specifically to each WTO agreement or discipline-which would
give a country a greater cushion (of 100 points per discipline) to correct
violations across disciplines. Under this approach, the EU and U.S. would be
subject to the "unclean hands" penalty in trade disputes, given their negative
scores on the Trade Compliance Scorecard when the trade sanction multiplier
and good behavior credits are used. (If the trade sanction multiplier is not used,
only the U.S. would face the penalty; the EU score is 13.) No country would
yet be disabled from bringing TRIPS challenges; the U.S., the sole country with
uncorrected TRIPS violations, still maintains a comfortable cushion at 62,
despite its noncompliance in 2 disputes. (Even more leniency would be
afforded to countries if the trade disputes were divided into different scorecards
by each agreement.)
Alternatively, the "unclean hands" penalty can be based on the total score
from the sum of all violations-which might put greater pressure on repeat
offenders to correct their violation (depending on the starting perfect score for
each country). For example, under a strict approach, the WTO could give a
total of 150 points for each country in the master scorecard (aggregating
compliance scores for TRIPS and all WTO disciplines). Under this approach,
the U.S. score worsens. It has the most uncorrected violations (7) and would
receive the worst overall score: -200 under the basic formula, -312 under the
143 See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands."); U.S.
Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (patent misuse doctrine is
extension of unclean hands doctrine under which "courts will not aid a patent owner who has
misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or
thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or 'purged' ").
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formula with trade sanction multiplier, and -207 under the formula with trade
sanction multiplier plus good behavior credit.
MAsTER WTO COMPUANCE SCORECARD (SIMPLE) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER LIVE VIOLATIONS YEARS TO COMPLY
United States -7 10 + 9 + 9 + 8 + 5 + 5 + 4 years + counting
EU -3 12 + 13 + 4 years + counting
Canada 0 (3 years 8 mos. + 10 mos. + 9 mos. + 8 mos.
C d+ 6 mos., 5 fixed)
China 0 (1 year + 9 mos., 2 fixed)
India 0 (19 mos. + 15 mos. + 5 mos., 3 fixed)
MAsTER WTO COMPuANCE ScoRECARD (COMPLEX) (0AN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 150
India 150
Canada 150
EU 63
United States -200
MASTER WTO COMLIANCE SCORECARD (COMPLEX + TRADE SANCTIONS) (JAN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 150
India 150
Canada 150
EU -87
United States -312
MASTMR WTO COMPLIANCE SCORECARD (COMPLEX + TRADE SANCIONs + GoOD
BEiAVIORCRDIT) (JIAN. 2011)
MEMBER COMPLIANCE SCORE
China 150
India 150
Canada 150
EU -36
United States -207
Although the U.S. and EU numbers are low, the numbers improve with
resolutions in only a few disputes. For example, the U.S. scores would improve
considerably if the Byrd Amendment dispute (the U.S. maintains the violation is
fixed) and the Upland Cotton dispute (the U.S. reached a Framework toward a
mutually agreed settlement with Brazil) are deemed to be resolved. Excluding
these two disputes, which seem close to final resolution, the U.S. scores
improve dramatically: -35 under both the basic formula and the formula with
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trade sanction multiplier for the WTO Compliance Scorecard, and a positive
overall score of 70 (out of 150) if Good Behavior Credit is also factored in.
The dramatic improvement in the U.S. score-by its resolution of only two
disputes-shows how the Scorecard affords a fair amount of leniency for
countries to correct even multiple violations, especially if the country in
question earns Good Behavior Credit. The U.S. still would maintain a positive
overall score, despite having five continuing violations.
Similarly, if the EU resolves the longstanding Bananas dispute, the EU score
improves to the positive territory on all cards: 118 under the basic formula, 70
under the formula with trade sanction multiplier, and 124 if the Good Behavior
Credit is included with the trade sanction multiplier. With these few
implementations, both the U.S. and EU would be comfortably above any
procedural penalty when Good Behavior Credit is included.
V. ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS TO THE COMPLIANCE SCORECARD
This Part addresses some possible objections to the Compliance Scorecard.
Some objections are general and apply to the idea of using a scorecard. Others
are specific to the proposed Scorecards above. I will address both types of
objections in turn.
A. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO USING A SCORECARD
1. Shaming Versus Dplomacy. Critics may contend that using a compliance
scorecard in the WTO runs counter to the spirit of diplomacy and fostering of
good will among WTO members. A scorecard misapprehends the nature of the
WTO dispute system. The WTO dispute system should not be viewed as a
rule-of-law system, but instead as a flexible system allowing for negotiated
concessions. 144 A scorecard for members listing their uncorrected violations on
the WTO website may cause them embarrassment, if not outright shame. Some
members may feel that so-called "naming and shaming" techniques are
anathema to the WTO in that they may frustrate diplomacy.
The debate over whether the WTO is a rule-of-law or bargaining system is
unlikely to be resolved.145 Perhaps more accurately, it is a combination of
both.146 Although the DSU prefers members to reach their own "mutually
144 See Dipute Settlement, supra note 15, at 418; Okediji, supra note 115, at 52 ("[Dlisputes create a
secondary market for renegotiation of existing bargains.").
145 See, e.g., GOLDsMITH & POSNER, supra note 67, at 160-61.
146 See Marco Dani, Remedying European Legal Pluralism: The FIAMM and FEDON Litigation and
the judicial Protection ofInternational Trade Bystanders, 21 EUR.J. INT'L L. 303, 321 (2010).
[Vol. 18:401440
40
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/4
2011] MEASURING TRIPS COMPLIANCE AND DEFIANCE
agreed solution," when bargaining fails-which it has in the noncompliance
cases discussed above-the DSU states that "the first objective of the dispute
settlement system is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned."1 47 Those who assert that diplomacy or bargaining should rule the
WTO ignore this fundamental precept.
Moreover, putting aside this theoretical debate, the actual practices of the
WTO refute the diplomacy objection. As discussed above, the WTO already
publicly identifies noncompliant members in numerous ways: (1) Panel and AB
decisions, which are posted on the WTO website, (2) dispute summaries on the
WTO website; (3) the minutes of the monthly DSB meetings, which are posted
on the WTO website; and (4) the WTO Annual Reports, which are posted on
the WTO website. If diplomacy and behind-the-scenes negotiations were all
the WTO cared about, then none of this information would ever be publicly
disclosed. After all, the "naming and shaming" of the noncompliant countries
on the current WTO website should undermine diplomatic dealings by this logic,
but that has not been the case.
Implicit in the "shaming" objection is the belief that delinquent WTO
countries would care more-or feel more embarrassment-about their scores
than the information about their violations already publicly disclosed by the
WTO. This is debatable. Frankly, my fear would be the opposite-that
delinquent countries would just ignore their scorecards. After all, who cares
about a scorecard when the WTO already has the power to authorize trade
sanctions against a country? In any event, a compliance scorecard, while
aggregating the data, would not contain any information that is not already
publicly disseminated by the WTO itself, other than an overall score in the case
of the Complex Scorecard. Moreover, the proposed Complex Scorecard credits
mutually agreed solutions-thus encouraging diplomatic negotiations-by
awarding Good Behavior Credit. Diplomacy and scorecards can go hand-in-
hand.
To the extent that countries would be swayed by their scorecards, that
prospect strikes me as all the more reason for the WTO to use a scorecard.
Because compliance with WTO decisions is a major goal of the DSB, the WTO
should consider reasonable tools to achieve that end. The several uncorrected
violations that have lasted over a decade in the DSB appear to be showing signs
of fracturing WTO members and leading some members openly to call into
question the legitimacy of the entire WTO.148 Diplomacy can tolerate only so
much delinquency before it cracks.
147 DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.7.
148 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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2. Political Feasibility of a Scorecard in the WITO. Perhaps the biggest objection
to using a compliance scorecard in the WTO is political: irrespective of the
merits and benefits of a scorecard, the WTO would never reach a consensus to
adopt it. Especially those countries that have outstanding violations can be
expected to vote against it.
My response is threefold. First, some version of a compliance scorecard,
such as the proposed Simple Scorecard, would not need any further action or
amendment by the WTO. The WTO Secretariat already provides summaries of
all disputes on the WTO website, and the Director-General of the WTO
provides summaries of all outstanding disputes, including violations, in his
Annual Report.149 If critics contend that a simple scorecard that merely lists the
number of violations for a country is outside the authority of the WTO
Secretariat or Director-General, then so too would be major parts of the current
WTO website and Annual Reports. Objectors would be hard pressed to argue
that the WTO website should be shut down. The Simple Scorecard merely
provides the same information the Secretariat already provides, albeit in a
different format.
Alternatively, the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) in the WTO might
assume the responsibility of keeping a compliance scorecard as a part of its
periodic trade policy reviews of WTO countries. Such a record-keeping
procedure is consistent with the TPRB's overall objective
to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciblines
and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and,
where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to
the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by
achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade
policies and practices of Members.150
As a part of the Trade Policy Review of each country, TPRB could include a
compliance scorecard in the report.
Second, to the extent that WTO members believe that the proposed
Complex Scorecard should be considered and approved by consensus, then the
WTO should consider that route. Granted, the prospect of garnering a
consensus may seem doubtful, if not nil. But the current situation-increasing
149 See supra note 79.
Iso Trade Policy Review Mechanism art. A(i), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 3, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round,
1869 U.N.T.S. 480 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TPRM]. As discussed above, the DSB
also could undertake the scorecard. See supra note 82.
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questions by members about the DSB's legitimacy in allowing decades-long
violations to go uncorrected-may not be sustainable in the long run for the
WTO as an institution. At some point, persistent, uncorrected violations may
kill the WTO-or, at least, cripple its effectiveness.
Third, should the WTO fail to implement a compliance scorecard, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or other entities-such as Global Trade
Alert, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICSTD),
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or even
WIPO-can easily undertake such a task. Scholars and researchers in the
international IP community might volunteer their time and assistance for such a
project. Having compiled the Scorecards herein with only two assistants, I do
not believe the project would require significant labor, especially after the first
scorecards are tabulated. Although a scorecard not from the WTO might carry
less weight among WTO members, it would still provide the public with greater
transparency regarding the WTO than currently exists.
B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED SCORECARDS
1. Bias Against Big Trading Countries and Heterogeneity Problem. Some may
object that my Scorecards are flawed in treating big trading countries like the
U.S. or China the same as small trading countries. Big trading countries with
large economies may be expected to face many more trade challenges in the
WTO than a country that has very little trade. Therefore, the big trading
countries should be afforded greater leeway under the Scorecards than other
countries.
Although this argument may have surface appeal, it goes against the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. There is nothing in the DSU that supports allowing
big trading countries more leeway to comply with their WTO obligations.
Under the DSU, each member is treated alike; the only exception is special
treatment for least-developed countries. 51 To the extent the WTO ever factors
in trading size, the greater the size of the trading country, the more frequent the
scrutiny the country receives from the WTO in the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism. 52
Moreover, the fact that a country has extensive trade cuts both ways.
Presumably, such countries have greater resources than small trading countries
to deal with WTO disputes and compliance. Also, larger trading countries
151 See DSU, supra note 13, art. 24.
152 See TPRM, supra note 150 (four largest trading countries reviewed every two years, while
next sixteen largest reviewed every four years and other countries every six years).
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probably could get away with a lot more questionable trade practices, absent the
WTO apparatus. Moreover, big trading countries that do face more WTO
challenges have greater opportunities to earn Good Behavior Credits under the
Complex Scorecard. As long as countries comply with WTO decisions, their
scores would not be adversely affected by the sheer number of trade disputes
they face.
A related objection is that my Scorecards treat not only all countries the
same, but also all violations and all WTO agreements the same. No attempt is
made to determine whether a violation is major or mior. All violations of the
various WTO treaties are lumped together in the master Scorecard (although
the individual Scorecards do provide narrower distinctions), one might object.
This heterogeneity objection is a red-herring. The DSU itself treats all disputes
under the same dispute settlement approach and even allows cross retaliation
across disciplines.'53 In the WTO, IP is treated as another trade issue. In other
words, the different disciplines of the WTO are all placed under the same
metric in the DSU. More generally, establishing a ranking system of
heterogeneous parts is perfectly feasible as long as the ranking system does not
attempt to test too many different dimensions.15 4 In the case of the proposed
Scorecards, only a few variables are measured, and they all center around one
thing: compliance with WTO decisions.
2. Gaming the Scorecard. One final worry is that the Complex Scorecard may
lead some members to try to game the system. For example, some countries
may attempt to inflate their Complex Scorecard by inviting meritless challenges
in order to earn Good Behavior Credits, or bring more challenges against
another member to lower its score. In short, countries would play games with
their compliance scores.
Avoiding some gaming of the system is probably impossible. But I find
unlikely the possibility that many countries will do so. Perhaps a few would.
But there is always risk for a country to lose when bringing a sham dispute.
Even if the sham dispute is successful, a country could face great public
embarrassment both domestically and internationally if the sham was later
revealed. For example, a political leader could lose re-election if voters found
out his trade representative spent hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars in
order to conduct a sham WTO dispute. In any event, the formula for the
Scorecard can be adjusted to discourage sham disputes (e.g., removing Good
153 See DSU, supra note 13, art. 3.7.
154 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things: What College Rankings Really Tell Us, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 69.
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Behavior Credits as a variable, or otherwise penalizing the score of any country
found to be engaging in sham WTO disputes).
VI. CONCLUSION
The WTO can benefit from greater transparency in countries'
(non)compliance with WTO decisions administered by the Dispute Settlement
Body. The current WTO website provides a wealth of data, but often in ways
that make it difficult to obtain an overall assessment of country compliance or
the status of all ongoing disputes with adjudicated violations. To correct this
design defect in the WTO website, this Article proposes the tabulation of a
Compliance Scorecard for TRIPS and its other disciplines. This Scorecard, to
be posted on the WTO website, would provide greater awareness of and
transparency to the WTO decisions and member compliance.
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